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Abstract: This article chronicles the infl uence of intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) over unwanted migration in Western Europe since the 1930s. It pays par-
ticular attention to what occurred during times of economic crisis, especially the 
Great Depression in the 1930s, the recession-hit 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
current global fi nancial diffi culties. The IGOs under consideration are the League of 
Nations during the 1930s and the European Commission from the 1970s onwards. 
The European Commission’s ability to infl uence West European states’ policies on 
unwanted migration has grown considerably since the League of Nations’ unsuc-
cessful attempts in the 1930s, especially in the lead-up to the current economic cri-
sis. This increase in power has been offset, however, by a decrease in the European 
Commission’s sympathy as Brussels increasingly regards unwanted migration as 
a security and justice issue rather than as a social and cultural one in a move that 
bears close resemblance to the stance of West European states. 
Keywords: Great Depression · Unwanted migration · West Europe · Economic 
crisis · IGOs
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to sketch the role of IGOs in migrant affairs during various 
periods of economic crisis in Europe. The article summarises the key developments 
in various Western European countries from a pan-European perspective and does 
not attempt to specify the tendencies of one single country. The three periods com-
pared here are 1930s, the 1970 and the current crises. 
During the crisis decade of the 1930s, the League of Nations’ High Commissioner 
for German Refugees unsuccessfully called for European countries to treat refu-
gees with hospitality in the face of increasing hostility. During the stagnant 1970s, 
and continuing into the early 1980s, the European Commission similarly urged Eu-
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ropean member states to treat its non-European migrants in a more sympathetic 
fashion. Despite these calls, neither the High Commissioner in the 1930s nor the 
European Commission during the so called oil price crises of the 1970s held con-
siderable sway in challenging states’ migrant policies. More recently, the European 
Commission’s ability to affect member states’ policies has increased dramatically 
ever since migration became a shared responsibility in the 1990s. By charting how 
IGOs reacted to states’ migration policies in Western Europe since the 1930s, and 
particularly during times of economic crisis, this paper will argue that the European 
Commission currently responsible for migration generally takes a less benevolent 
view of the rights of unwanted migrants than their Commission precursors in the 
1970s and early 1980s and the League of Nations’ High Commissioner for German 
Refugees in the 1930s. Despite the inherent diffi culties that arise from analysing dif-
ferent socio-economic and political settings, examining the role of IGOs over time 
can lead to intriguing fi ndings; as Peter Kolchin notes, comparing cases “can create 
an awareness of alternatives, showing developments to be signifi cant that without 
a comparative perspective might not appear so” (Kolchin 1982: 64-5). 
To expound and substantiate the argument put forward, the fi rst part of the ar-
ticle will concentrate on the international reaction in Western Europe to unwanted 
migration during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Subsequently, the paper will 
discuss how the European Commission responded to states’ treatment of unwanted 
migrants during the time of the oil price crises in 1973 and 1979. Thereafter, the 
rise in infl uence of the European Commission on migration-related issues will be 
illustrated, as will the repercussions for unwanted migrants in the current crisis. As 
will become apparent in this paper, West European governments often introduced 
additional measures to prevent the arrival or stay of certain migrants during eco-
nomic depressions and recessions. These migrants can be, as will be demonstrated 
below, refugees, economic migrants or asylum seekers. They are all “unwanted” by 
governments during times of economic crisis; hence the use of the term “unwanted 
migrants” throughout to describe those migrants who received special treatment 
from governments during times of economic diffi culty in Western Europe. 
Various contemporary (e.g., Simpson 1939; Thompson 1938) and later accounts 
(e.g., Arendt 2004; Caron 1999; Marrus 1985; Skran 1995; Beck 1999; Hathaway 
2005; Heim 2010) have been written about the League of Nations’ efforts to support 
unwanted migrants during the 1930s. Similarly, certain experts have considered the 
reaction of the European Commission to states’ attempts to enforce additional meas-
ures on unwanted migrants during the oil price crises of the 1970s (e.g. Simmonds 
1988; Berlinghoff 2009). Rarely, however, have scholars compared and contrasted 
the treatment of unwanted migrants in Western Europe during different economic 
crises to discover whether any similarities and differences exist between them. The 
extensive and extended nature of the current global fi nancial crisis has resulted in 
the publication of numerous economic surveys that have reanalysed in some detail 
the response to past slumps and downturns with the aim of demonstrating whether 
the world can learn anything from previous experiences (e.g. Reinhart/Rogoff 2009; 
Bierman Jr 2010). By analysing previously understudied primary sources from IGOs 
in past decades and by drawing on certain recent studies written on the eras in 
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question, this article similarly intends to chronicle the diachronic development of 
international protection in Western Europe for unwanted migrants since the 1930s. 
By doing so, it will highlight some past trends in the treatment of unwanted migrants 
in Western Europe during periods of economic instability that may reoccur during 
the present crisis.
2 Tightening the borders: The 1930s
Improved transportation and a more globalised world heralded in a notable increase 
in movement during the so-called “age of mass migration” between 1850 and 1914, 
especially from Europe, India and China (Hatton/Williamson 1998; Lucassen/Lucas-
sen 2009: 374; McKeown 2004: 166). Restrictive measures linked to the rise of eth-
nic nationalism did begin to arise sporadically in various jurisdictions across Europe 
from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, notably in Prussia in the 1880s 
and 1890s (Reinecke 2008: 66-70) and in England in the early twentieth century 
(Collyer 2005: 289). Instead of lifting their bellicose measures following the end of 
the First World War, some West European countries reinforced them (Torpey 2003: 
84). Signifi cantly, the United States, which had accepted approximately one million 
immigrants annually up until 1914, was one of the countries to initiate measures 
to stem migration after the First World War. Following John Dillingham’s negative 
reports on immigration, the American Congress superseded President Woodrow 
Wilson to implement legislation in 1917, leading to the insertion of various immigra-
tion restrictions in 1921 and 1924 (Hatton/Williamson 2004a; Timmer/Williamson 
1998). West European states, which had actually relaxed their immigration policies 
following the end of the First World War – although the security measures brought 
in during the war did not all disappear – began instigating more restrictive policies 
during the recession-hit 1930s (Caestecker/Moore 2010: 314-5). Previously, these 
unwanted migrants might have found a home across the Atlantic, as had occurred 
during former economic crises in the nineteenth century. This time, however, West-
ern European countries had to adapt to the extra burden that the disappearance of 
America as an emigration destination placed upon them.
Hobsbawm (1992) has termed the interwar years the “apogee of nationalism”, as 
new approaches to nationalism perceived that a named human population shared a 
common history, territory and language. Anyone considered ineligible from sharing 
these traits, such as ethnic minorities or migrants, became conspicuous in the eyes 
of the public and governments. To amplify this even further, the post-WWI develop-
ment in many Western European countries of modern systems of social organisa-
tion – the so-called “welfare state” – led to an even greater distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens (Hathaway 2005: 83). The consequences of increases in 
passport control, as well as the popular support for the ethnic state all over Europe 
meant that entry – and stay – became more diffi cult to attain for refugees and eco-
nomic migrants alike. 
The 1930s saw a noticeable decrease in the number of people trying to migrate 
compared to the 1920s, when over one million Russian refugees had fl ed to various 
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European countries (Jaeger 1999: 1). Nevertheless, the worsening economic condi-
tions that followed the 1929 Great Wall Street Crash and the growth in power of the 
middle and working classes, who voiced their concern about the perceived threat 
from foreign labour, resulted in most migrants in the 1930s receiving considerably 
more hostile treatment than their 1920s’ counterparts. States strengthened their 
enforcement mechanisms to restrict and expel unwanted migrants as the 1930s 
progressed. German Jews fl eeing Nazism often received the most rancorous recep-
tion. Due to increasing stipulations barring newcomers from taking up employment 
during the 1930s fi nancial depression, it fell to Jewish refugee aid committees in 
Western Europe to reassure governments that they would provide the fi nancial sup-
port necessary to ensure that German Jews would not place an undue burden on 
receiving states. Despite this initially resulting in relatively sympathetic Western Eu-
ropean policies towards German Jews in 1933, when the exodus began, these same 
aid committees quickly saw their funds deplete as a result of the size of the infl ux 
(Caestecker/Moore 2010: 219). Signifi cantly, as German Jews continued to arrive in 
Western Europe, national governments preferred to designate them as temporary 
refugees rather than as political refugees because of the fear that this would entitle 
those same migrants to certain benefi ts associated with liberal traditions of political 
asylum (Caestecker/Moore 2010: 317). Events in 1938 made it impossible for West 
European states to deny that German and Austrian Jews were anything other than 
political refugees; as a result they stepped up their efforts to strengthen their ex-
ternal controls, through strict visa policies and improved border controls, to try to 
stem the fl ow (Caestecker/Moore 2010: 238). 
The international reaction to the German refugee crisis derived principally from 
the League of Nations’ efforts to fi nd some kind of a solution. To aid those fl ee-
ing Nazi Germany, the intergovernmental League appointed a High Commissioner 
responsible for German refugees, with the American James McDonald taking up 
the post in October 1933. McDonald noted in 1935 that ‘the daily grace in the High 
Commissioner’s offi ce was “Thank God for Palestine”’ (Marrus 1985: 163), on ac-
count of its absorption of Jewish refugees. But the Arab Revolt of 1936 made the 
British wary of the potential effect continuing Jewish emigration could have on its 
rule over Palestine. Thereafter, the British government repeatedly decreased the 
amount of Jewish immigrants entitled to enter Palestine and took away the special 
benefi ts they had previously bestowed upon German Jews just at the time when the 
situation facing those same people steadily worsened (Halamish 2010: 142) Simi-
larly, the United States, Britain and France began to frown upon Jewish emigration 
to Shanghai at the behest of some of their wealthy citizens living in the open city, 
which required no documents to land and which received approximately 14,000 
Jewish refugees between 1938 and the summer of 1939; it would have closed off its 
territory sooner albeit for Japanese resistance to Western governments’ pressure 
(Hochstadt 2010: 114-117).
Following just over two years as High Commissioner for German Refugees, Mc-
Donald resigned from his post in 1935. McDonald’s replacement as High Commis-
sioner, the Briton Sir Neill Malcolm, inherited an even less powerful role than his 
predecessor (Heim 2010: 29). Nonetheless, Malcolm still managed to bring together 
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representatives from fi fteen countries in late 1936 for a conference focused on the 
German refugee question. 
States, although publicly supportive of potential measures to alleviate the suf-
fering of German refugees within their territories, remained particularly hesitant to 
commit to helping potential future arrivals from Germany. Romania noted that it 
had already reached its capacity for receiving refugees, apart from those travelling 
through the country.1 The Netherlands wanted to retain its power to allow or disal-
low refugees from entering its territory. Switzerland repeatedly drew attention to 
the problem of clandestine refugees and underlined the diffi culties caused by their 
continued entry at a time of economic depression, stating its preference to “aid the 
refugee coming from Germany to settle elsewhere” rather than allow them settle in 
its territory.2 Resembling recent asylum debates, Belgium thought countries should 
be allowed to ask refugees to return to the country in which they found fi rst asy-
lum.3 Nevertheless, in addition to the UK, France, Norway and Denmark, all of the 
countries named above, except Romania, adopted a provisional 1936 non-binding 
arrangement set out in the conference with various amendments that bestowed 
refugee status upon Germans who had arrived in those countries between 1933 
and 1936. Further efforts by the High Commissioner for German Refugees to attain 
states’ acquiescence to more authoritative rules defi ning their treatment of German 
refugees proved mostly futile, however. Only two countries, the UK and Belgium, 
ratifi ed the later Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Ger-
many, completed in February 1938 as restrictive measures against rising numbers 
of refugees from Germany and Austria became more widespread (see Robinson 
1953: 3).4
Despite their lack of international representation, pro-migrant groups did suc-
ceed in mitigating the severity of restrictive migration policies in some countries. 
In France, for example, substantial sections of the Communist and Socialist Parties, 
the League of Rights of Man and Citizen, the Catholic Left and several Jewish bod-
ies continued to promote more generous policies, resulting in the Popular Front’s 
slackening of immigration restrictions in 1936 (Caron 1999: 141). In the United King-
dom, pro-asylum opinion in the wake of the November Pogroms in 1938 caused the 
British government to repeal its restrictive policies brought in after the ”Anschluss” 
in March of the same year (Marfl eet 2006: 136). Public protests in Belgium also 
caused the national government to halt expulsions of Jewish refugees (Caestecker/
Moore 2010: 260). In the United States, pro-migrant actors focused enough pres-
sure on the government for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to convene a conference 
in Evian in July 1938. Indeed, in the months leading up to Evian, several prominent 
1 “Inter-Governmental Conference on the Legal Status of Refugee coming from Germany”, Sec-
ond Meeting, 2 July 1936, S.R.A./1st Session/P.V.2., League of Nations archives.
2 Ibid.
3 Inter-Governmental Conference on the Legal Status of Refugee coming from Germany’, Fourth 
Meeting, 3 July 1936, S.R.A./1st Session/P.V.4, League of Nations archives.
4 France also ratifi ed the convention but this came in 1945. 
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Jewish voluntary groups – and Christian voluntary groups, to a lesser extent – came 
together for a conference to discuss the refugee issue. Almost simultaneously, two 
prominent Jewish politicians, Emanuel Celler and Samuel Dickstein, publicly raised 
the subject in the American Congress (Sjoberg 1991: 113). Dorothy Thompson’s 
article in the April 1938 edition of Foreign Affairs gave further vent to the consterna-
tion amongst certain organisations surrounding America’s failure to try to help fi nd 
a solution to the European refugee crisis (Thompson 1938; see also Sjoberg 1991: 
70-1 and 116). 
In July 1938, twenty-nine governments came together in a small French town 
to discuss the problem of refugees fl eeing Nazism. Roosevelt’s defi ned terms for 
discussion at the Evian conference, which ensured that existing immigration laws 
remained in place, meant that the conference produced little by way of feasible re-
sults to help refugees (Sjoberg 1991: 124). Instead, most of the focus concentrated 
on how the Jewish exodus had “become so great that it renders racial and religious 
problems more acute, increases international unrests [sic], and may hinder serious-
ly the process of appeasement in international relations.”5 The resolution adapted 
at Evian also recorded that:
“[T]he involuntary emigration of large numbers of people, of different 
creeds, economic conditions, professions and trades [...] is disturbing to 
the general economy, since these persons are obliged to seek refuge, either 
temporarily or permanently, in other countries at a time when there is seri-
ous unemployment.”6
The resolution’s negligible recommendations – the highlight involved setting up 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which held few formal competenc-
es and reacted cautiously – clearly demonstrated states’ reservations in helping ref-
ugees escape Nazi persecution. The silent understanding between the Americans 
and the UK to refrain from raising the subject of migration to Palestine merely con-
fi rmed this (Halamish 2010: 131). Thirty-nine private voluntary organisations (PVOs) 
[similar to modern-day NGOs], including twenty-one Jewish groups, had attended 
the conference in an unoffi cial capacity. Four different opinions resonated amongst 
PVOs: (i) to encourage Jews to emigrate to Palestine by lifting the contemporary 
quotas; (ii) to integrate refugees in their present environment; (iii) to settle Jew-
ish refugees in an as yet uninhabited location; and (iv) to guarantee Jews minority 
rights in their new countries of asylum.7 The disjointed tactics of PVOs meant that 
their voice remained weak and disjointed. In Michael Marrus’s (1985: 170-2) words, 
“Evian simply underscored the unwillingness of the Western countries to receive 
5 Resolution adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee (Evian) on July 14th, 1938. Published 
in League of Nations Offi cial Journal, Vol. 19, 1938: 676-677.
6 Ibid.
7 “Report for the sub-committee for the reception of organisations concerned with the relief of 
political refugees coming from Germany including Austria”, 13 July 1938, S543, League of Na-
tions archives.
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unwanted Jewish refugees” with “one delegate after another read[ing] statements 
into the record, justifying existing restrictive policies and congratulating themselves 
on how much had already been accomplished for refugees.” As Caestecker and 
Moore (2010: 319) have demonstrated, immigration remained a domestic rather 
than an international issue in the wake of Evian. Soon after the conference, Hungary 
and Yugoslavia closed their frontiers, Italy announced its 1938 anti-Jewish decrees, 
and Holland, Belgium and Switzerland reinforced their borders to restrict the entry 
of refugees (Marrus 1985: 169). 
Events in Austria and Germany from March to November 1938 turned, in the 
words of Claudena Skran (1995: 53), “a manageable refugee fl ow into an uncontrol-
lable fl ood”. Despite an outcry in West European public and media opinion, most 
governments intensifi ed their external controls through visa issuing facilities and 
border controls (Caestecker/Moore 2010: 274 and 277). This partly resulted from 
the 1938 Nazi laws forbidding Jews fl eeing from taking their belongings and sav-
ings. Previously, Jews brought certain economic advantages to host states because 
they managed to arrive with some of their resources from Germany but from 1938 
onwards Jews frequently arrived penniless at a time of continuing economic de-
pression. 
Between early 1936 and mid 1938, private organisations and individuals drew 
the High Commissioner’s attention to approximately 5,000 cases where German 
refugees received expulsion orders from countries of asylum, leading to the High 
Commissioner’s intervention to halt “unauthorised measures of expulsion taken by 
the police or minor offi cials”.8 But the cessation of the High Commissioner’s offi ce 
on 1 January 1939 closed this avenue off despite the marked augmentation of refu-
gees fl eeing Nazism and by then Fascist Spain. By the outbreak of war in Septem-
ber 1939, the number of people who escaped Nazism since 1933 had increased to 
400,000.9 More would have left except for the increasingly restrictive immigration 
policies of European countries caused by anti-Semitism, labour shortages and refu-
gees’ destitution in the crisis-hit 1930s.
2.1 Migration management during post-war crises
The end of the Second World War instigated several crucial developments. Coun-
tries vowed to make sure the newly formed United Nations would serve the world 
better than the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations, signed in 
1945, insured, cemented and enhanced the role of private voluntary organisa-
tions; these organisations then became known as non-governmental organisations 
8 Neill Malcolm, “Refugees coming from Germany”, 22 Aug 1938, A.25.1938.XII, League of Na-
tions archives.
9 League of Nations, “International Assistance to Refugees: Supplementary Report to the Twen-
tieth Assembly by Sir Herbert Emerson” (20 Oct. 1939), p. 2. Contained in Fonds UNHCR 5, 
“Personal Papers of Gustave G. Kullmann, Box 6. Its report recorded that 225,000 Jews fl ed 
from Germany, 134,000 Jews from Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, and 40,000 non-Jews from 
both. See also Skran 1995: 54.
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(NGOs) to distinguish them from the various UN bodies. By stipulating that the UN 
could “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organi-
sations which are concerned with matters within its competence” they ensured the 
presence of NGOs in signifi cant political discussions – a development that has had 
consequences for more recent migration debates, as will be outlined towards the 
end of this article.10
Exclusive measures towards immigrants could not be maintained in the wake 
of the Second World War because of the incredible population loss that the car-
nage had infl icted – approximately 36.5 million people died on the continent from 
war-related causes (Judt 2005: 17). Furthermore, Western Europe needed to rebuild 
since approximately 40 % of German housing, 30 % of British housing and 20 % 
of French housing had been destroyed during the war (Judt 2005: 82). Western 
Europe needed labour, especially when the European economy began to take off 
once again in the 1950s. Here the European countries took different approaches in 
shaping the emerging migration regimes. Those regimes were deeply rooted in the 
history of each single country: while countries with strong colonial ties mixed their 
minority policies with their migrant policies, countries such as Germany and Aus-
tria developed a new system that enabled the recruitment and rotation of workers 
from abroad. Other countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, adopted mixed 
forms of migration regulations. 
Millions of people, who came predominantly from rural backgrounds, migrated 
from countries located on the periphery of Western European to the core of West-
ern Europe to help the post-war expansion. Seven million left Italy between 1945 
and 1970, a quarter of Greece’s population of working age departed between 1950 
and 1970, and 1.5 million Portuguese migrated between 1961 and 1974 (Judt 2005: 
334). West Germany, Switzerland, the Benelux countries and France were the main 
receivers, with the UK also welcoming approximately half a million Irish migrants 
from 1945 to 1961 (Keogh 1994: 164 and 215). Nevertheless, this failed to meet la-
bour demands in the host states, which began instead to look beyond Western Eu-
rope for migrant labour. The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Belgium 
received large numbers of migrants from their colonies, while Western Germany 
recruited signifi cant numbers of Turks and Yugoslavs, as well as other nationali-
ties from Southern European and Northern-African states, under the Gastarbeiter 
scheme. National and local administrative bodies in many Western European coun-
tries continued to believe migrants were temporary and would depart if work oppor-
tunities decreased. For that same reason, they saw no need to invest in infrastruc-
ture such as social housing, schools and medical care for their enlarged populations 
(Berlinghoff 2009: 185). When the number of immigrants began to place substantial 
pressures on social services and the economy of Western European countries in the 
early 1970s began to stagnate, demands for foreign labour slowed. In 1972 Denmark 
declared a recruitment ban for all non EEC and Scandinavian countries. In 1973 the 
UK implemented its Immigration Act and Western Germany stopped any further 
10 Section 71, Charter of the United Nations 1945. 
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recruitment. The following year, both Belgium and the Netherlands tightened their 
immigration policies and France declared a halt to immigration (Berlinghoff 2009: 
189; see also Hansen 2003: 27). At around the same time, 1973 oil price shock re-
sulted in serious economic recession throughout Western Europe. By then, West 
Germany had approximately 2.8 million foreign workers, France held 2.3 million im-
migrant workers, and Great Britain contained almost 2 million immigrants from the 
Commonwealth (Judt 2005: 335-6). 
2.2 1970s-1980s: European Commission vs. European states
During the 1950s and 1960s, Western Europe reached almost full employment (Judt 
2005: 332). Labour relations problems in Western Europe and a notable rise in com-
modity prices did, however, result in accelerated infl ation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Mazower 1998: 334). Following the demise of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971, partly as a result of the U.S. government’s need to fi nance its role in the 
Vietnam War, and the 1973 oil price shock, a recession-hit Western Europe saw un-
employment rise considerably throughout the 1970s. France’s unemployment rate 
went from 2.6 % in 1971 to 7 % by the end of the decade. The UK rate rose from 
3.6 % to 9 % in the same period. Although German unemployment failed to reach 
such scales, it too suffered a notable rise (Judt 2005: 456-7; see also Cameron 2001: 
8-9). 
Despite attempts by many Western European countries to limit the in-fl ow of mi-
grant workers from the early 1970s onwards, the reunifi cation of families with those 
already in situ meant that unwanted migration continued at a steady pace. Many 
countries’ constitutions formed after the Second World had extended rights to na-
tionals and non-nationals alike, which led to a noticeable increase in cases involving 
immigrants brought before the courts challenging restrictive changes in the 1970s 
(Guiraudon 1997: 234). As Joppke (1998: 271) has convincingly argued, the growth 
of inherently liberal principles in many western states throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century made it increasingly diffi cult for Western European govern-
ments to exercise complete control over unwanted migration. Developments at the 
European Commission stemmed government actions even further.  
The 1957 Treaty of Rome stated that “freedom of movement for workers shall 
be secured within the Community” and that this would “entail the abolition of any 
state discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States 
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employ-
ment”.11 Although this only applied to European member citizens (cf. Oliver 1985: 
62), the European Commission began to take a further interest in conditions facing 
all immigrants – from member states and elsewhere  – from the early 1970s onwards 
because of the obvious social issues emerging as a result of the sizeable immigrant 
communities in many member states. Soon after the 1973 oil shock, the European 
Commission published its social action programme. One objective was to achieve 
11 Article 48 (1) and 48 (2), Treaty of Rome.
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“an equality in living and working conditions” for “all migrant workers and their fami-
lies, whether they come from the countries of the Community” or “whether legally 
admitted from third countries” (Commission of the European Communities 1974: 
23). The Commission felt that:
“The migration population live and work in conditions substantially inferior 
to those of the indigenous population. Discrimination against migrant work-
ers exists in various forms throughout the Community, in such matters as 
social security, housing and rights to participate at different levels of deci-
sion making (ibid).”  
In the Commission’s opinion, there was “an urgent need for the Community 
to assume its overall human responsibilities towards the whole migrant popula-
tion, irrespective of its country of origin”. It felt that this could only be achieved by 
developing “an overall approach to coordinate different aspects” (ibid). Later that 
same year, it proposed an action programme in favour of migrant workers and their 
families. In it, the Commission criticised member states’ treatment of third country 
migrants even more explicitly and voiced its aim to “move towards concertation of 
immigration policies”. While migrants coming from other member states acquired 
many of the same rights as those of indigenous workers under Community legisla-
tion, third country migrants:
“[...] do not have the right to freely enter the territory of the host country for 
the exercise of employment; they are required to possess a work permit 
and are subject to administrative controls [ …] Third country migrants are 
liable to deportation, too often at the discretion of the host country authori-
ties.” (Commission of the European Communities 1976: 14)
Again, the Commission’s suggestion to tackle this problem revolved around the 
aim of “adopting a common strategy to meet the problem (ibid).” 
When Western European states, acting through the forum of the European Coun-
cil, took note of the Commission’s proposals in its resolution of 9 February 1976, 
they failed to outline whether or not member states should consult each other over 
the issue of providing rights for third country migrants. By contrast, when the Coun-
cil discussed the subject of clandestine immigration, it considered it “important 
to strengthen cooperation between Member States in the campaign against ille-
gal immigration of workers who are nationals of third countries”. The Council also 
sought to “undertake appropriate consultations on migration policies vis à vis third 
countries” (Council of the European Communities 1976: 8). This split in inclination 
of European member states to confer with one another over matters of prohibi-
tion, whilst avoiding consultation with regard to the treatment of immigrants within 
member states, was a sign of things to come. 
Despite attempts by West European countries to stem immigration, migration 
continued to grow, mainly due to family reunifi cation. The late 1970s saw parties 
variously labelled “extreme right-wing”, “populist” and “anti-immigrant” parties in 
Europe start to become increasingly prominent (Agnazi 1995; Gibson 2002). Halt-
ing immigration became one of the most central tenets of many of these parties’ 
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manifestos. The large increases in the number of people migrating to Europe and 
governments’ perceived weaknesses in adapting their policies to cope with this 
upsurge served to bestow anti-immigrant political parties with a seemingly legiti-
mate target to communicate their message. With immigrants sometimes entitled 
to welfare provisions and housing at a time of increasing fi nancial insecurity, politi-
cal, media and public hostility towards immigrants rose. As a consequence, these 
parties’ anti-immigrant stance began to fi nd resonance with voters, coinciding as 
it did with a decline in traditional political parties’ ability to address the needs of 
some of their electorate (Mair 2006). Serious cleavages began to develop amongst 
more traditional political parties. Indeed, one of the factors that made immigration 
and asylum so diffi cult to analyse was that voters from sometimes very different 
political backgrounds could change parties because of their strong stances on such 
issues. As Paul Sniderman et al. (2000: 13) recorded, when issues relating to im-
migration moved to the centre of political argument, “the animating values of the 
right resonate[d] not only with its own adherents but also with a very large portion 
of the adherents of the left”. 
In an attempt to allay this trend, established political parties in Western Europe 
reacted in a number of ways; with varying degrees of success. In some countries, 
they attempted to retain, or attract back, their traditional voters by adapting and 
reshaping many of the ideas put forward by these anti-immigration parties and sell-
ing them as their own. In the run-up to the 1979 general election in the UK, for 
instance, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party successfully adopted some of 
the increasingly popular British National Front’s policies to stem the fl ow of vot-
ers (Messina 1987: 419-420). Conversely, in some countries conventional political 
parties attempted to ignore or isolate these anti-immigration parties. This met with 
mixed results in states such as Belgium and West Germany (Schain/Zolberg/Hossay 
2002). If the established parties ignored or cut off anti-immigrant parties, they risked 
enabling those same parties to attain a foothold in the political system by gaining 
the protest votes of people frustrated with the more regular parties. With the acqui-
sition of a certain number of representative seats, anti-immigrant parties had the 
potential to expand their vote because of the high-profi le nature of their new posi-
tions in society and the structural benefi ts that came their way on obtaining offi ce. 
Reacting to the notable rise in racism in Europe throughout the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the European Commission and the European Parliament made various 
calls to act on immigration, including the 1977 Joint Declaration on Fundamental 
Rights, which affi rmed respect for the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. 
But Andrew Geddes (2000: 54) fi ttingly commented that “as with many EU denun-
ciations of racism and xenophobia, the declaration was essentially symbolic and not 
backed by attribution of competence to act”. By the mid 1980s, the Commission felt 
that a community migration policy had become all the more necessary and conse-
quently put forward a set of guidelines for such a policy in which it highlighted some 
of the problems associated with immigration:
“A number of Member States had to face similar problems: inadequate 
social education infrastructure and housing shortages as migrant families 
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were increasingly reunited, diffi culties in cultural assimilation, uneasy re-
lationships between the national and foreign communities, and potential 
competition on the labour market.” (European Commission 1985: 6)
Many of the recommendations contained foresight and appeared to include a 
genuine wish to help migrants to enjoy a better standard of living in society. For 
example, the Commission aimed to “provide members of their [migrants’] families 
residing in the Community with the same protection in the fi eld of social security as 
Community nationals” because “workers in the same objective situation cannot be 
treated differently on the sole basis of nationality” (ibid: 14). In July 1985, the Coun-
cil endorsed these proposals but when the Commission attempted to go further 
by setting up a prior communication procedure on migration policies, West Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK opposed such developments. 
The Commission had asked the member states to provide it with “draft measures 
they inten[ded] to take with regard to third country workers and members of their 
families, in the areas of entry, residence and employment”, along with “the texts of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action already in force, 
and also the texts of agreements made with third countries” (ibid: 19-20). Brussels 
wanted to “facilitate the adoption of a common position … particularly as regards 
international instruments relating to migration”. For many Western European gov-
ernments, it was a step too far: the Commission had exceeded its strictures. 
West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK proceeded to 
make submissions to the European Court of Justice against the Commission, argu-
ing that the Treaty of Rome had made no provision for a common policy in the social 
fi eld and that the Commission’s role was designated to exclusively deal with non-
binding instruments (Simmonds 1988: 182-3). At the oral procedure stage of the 
court hearing, the Commission communicated its past problems with the member 
states regarding a common migration policy (Simmonds 1988: 197). The European 
Court of Justice annulled certain parts of the Commission’s policy initiative, with the 
overall effect of fudging the issue. What the case did show, however, was the intent 
of many West European states to keep the Commission, which had shown itself to 
be in favour of integrating unwanted migrants into European societies, away from 
an issue that they saw as something for states alone to contemplate. Various gov-
ernments considered the Commission’s attempt to dictate member states’ social 
policies as an attack on their sovereignty. In response, European justice and interior 
ministers created an Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (AHI) in 1986. Critically, this was 
an intergovernmental body set up on an intergovernmental initiative with little Com-
mission involvement. 
Another almost simultaneous inter-governmental initiative, the Schengen Agree-
ment, also had a signifi cant affect on immigration policy in Western Europe. The 
aim of the fi rst Schengen Agreement, signed in June 1985 by the Benelux countries, 
France and Germany, aimed to gradually decrease controls on community citizens 
crossing internal borders having originated as a reaction to roadblocks set up by 
truck drivers irritated by the long delays they experienced when passing between 
the Franco-German borders (Lahav 2004: 42). The intention of the second Schengen 
Agreement, signed in 1990, bore little resemblance to the fi rst. As Sandra Lavenex 
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(2001: 95) explained, “the biggest consensus among the contracting parties was 
manifested in questions relating to the fi ght against illegal immigration and the in-
take of asylum seekers, which was in fact where the most detailed and far-reaching 
provisions were adopted – although the question of asylum seekers and refugees 
was not even mentioned in Schengen I.” With these changes, Schengen came to 
signify for many critics “Fortress Europe” due to the inclusion of a number of mea-
sures relating to the harmonisation of regulations concerning checks at external 
frontiers, the improvement of international co-operation at the level of the police 
and judiciary and the harmonization of visa and immigration policies. Julian Schutte 
(1991: 550) has pointed out that “the most spectacular novelty” was the creation of 
a set of common automated data relating to wanted persons called the Schengen 
Information System “to help with the maintenance of public order and security, and 
the enforcement of the laws on the control of aliens” (Schutte 1991: 559). The 1987 
Single European Act (SEA) and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty confi rmed these objec-
tives and it became clear that Western European countries had to create a more 
common strategy for migration.
Just as European countries appeared to gain a grip on achieving a consensus to 
control economic migrants attempting to gain access to the EU, another phenom-
enon emerged. Between 1985 and 1994, over 3.4 million people (Eurostat: 1996) 
made asylum applications in the EU as a result of increasing international confl icts 
(the break-up of Yugoslavia, in particular), the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet regime. As economic migrants found it more dif-
fi cult to enter Western Europe, some potential migrants also looked to asylum as a 
way of facilitating entry to the EU. In an attempt to regulate this in-fl ow, European 
immigration ministers adopted the Dublin Convention in 1990 to eradicate so-called 
“asylum-shopping” by ensuring that an asylum seeker could only make an applica-
tion in his/her country of arrival. 
3 The international community’s attitude to migration during the 
present crisis
In the 1990s, European member states’ tendency to remove the possibility of Com-
mission tinkering with national immigration and asylum policies for non-EU citizens 
continued, with immigration and asylum too politically explosive for most coun-
tries’ governments to give up national competency (Hatton/Williamson 2004b: 25, 
32). Instead, inter-governmental working groups, comprised of ministers from vari-
ous member states with responsibility for immigration, brought forward several 
initiatives. Virginie Guiraudon (2000: 251) acutely surmised the idea behind these 
moves:
“Building upon pre-existing policy settings and developing new policy 
frames, governments have circumvented national constraints on migration 
control by creating transnational co-operation mechanisms dominated by 
law and order offi cials, with EU institutions playing a minor role. European 
trans-governmental working groups have avoided judicial scrutiny, elimi-
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nating other national adversaries and enlisted the help of transnational ac-
tors such as transit countries and carriers.”
Although intra-national discussions on migration in Europe began in the 1980s 
and continued to gather apace throughout the 1990s, the 2000s marked the reinte-
gration of asylum and third country migration policies into the domain of the Euro-
pean Commission. The 1999 European Council meeting at Tampere signalled the 
beginning of the end of the differences between the Commission and the mem-
ber states concerning asylum and migration policy. Signifi cantly, member states 
allowed migration to return to the European Commission domain only after it had 
become fi rmly established under the responsibility of the EU’s third pillar, which 
represented security and justice affairs, rather than under the directorate-general 
representing employment, social affairs and equal opportunities (Guiraudon 2000; 
Costello 2003). This meant that notions of security continually tended to supersede 
notions of migrants’ rights. As a result, the European Commission had lost its long 
battle to moderate West European countries’ asylum and immigrant policies, with 
the member states’ more restrictionist views fi rmly winning out. To defend their 
immigration policies throughout the 2000s, West European states fashioned argu-
ments based on principles relating to European sovereignty, the integrity of welfare 
regimes and public security. In contrast to European Commission efforts to counter 
member states’ more parsimonious measures in the 1970s and 1980s, the Euro-
pean Commission in the 2000s facilitated West European states’ policies by joining 
together with the European Council to help externalise and securitize European asy-
lum and migration policies – particularly after 9-11 – in an attempt to stem the fl ow 
of unwanted migrants (Lavenex 2006: 334; cf Neal 2009). This became more obvi-
ous throughout the 2000s. In 2004, for instance, Italy began returning thousands of 
migrants to Libya that it had intercepted en route to its territory (Paoletti 2011: 275). 
Pro-migrant NGOs, such as Medicins sans Frontieres, and the UNHCR, denounced 
Italy’s move, pointing out that the state had repatriated migrants without offering 
them clear access to proper asylum procedures. They also highlighted Libya’s con-
tinuing failure to sign the UN Refugee Convention (Corriere della Serra 2004; La 
Stampa 2004b). The Italian government countered these criticisms by maintaining 
that its actions corresponded to all national and international norms. Crucially, the 
European Commission – in contrast to the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe – mutely supported the Italian government’s measures (La Stampa 2004a). 
The model of lightly regulated fi nancial capitalism that emerged over the past 
three decades resulted, in 2008, in the worst international economic downturn since 
the 1930s. The consequences of the global fi nancial crisis, variously referred to by 
leading economists as the Great Recession (e,g, Stiglitz 2010: xi) and the Lesser 
Depression (Krugman 2011), have largely continued to affect Western Europe una-
bated since then, with the ongoing Euro crisis not yet showing any signs of ending. 
A past European Commission (1997: 1) survey on racism and xenophobia concluded 
that people dissatisfi ed with their life circumstances, who feared unemployment, 
remained insecure about their futures and held little confi dence in public authorities 
were most likely to support xenophobic views. Amid rising unemployment, mount-
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ing public dissatisfaction with governments, and unsustainable state debts causing 
uncertainty about what the future holds, the conditions outlined in the European 
Commission survey are growing throughout Western Europe, particularly along 
the western (Ireland and the UK), southern (Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain) and 
northern (Denmark and Finland) periphery. This has led many West European states 
to discuss enforcing their residence laws more strictly, improving their border man-
agement and boosting their return programmes (Frontex 2009: 4).
As the IOM (2010: 4) has noted, the situation facing migrants, and especially 
non-EU migrants, has deteriorated more rapidly than that of natives during the cri-
sis. Migrants employed in low-skilled sectors especially affected by the economic 
recession, such as the construction industry and the services sector, have been par-
ticularly badly hit by unemployment since 2008 (Beets/Willekens 2009). Somewhat 
predictably, many migrants previously required by West European countries to help 
drive their economies forward have now become unwanted – just as occurred dur-
ing the 1970s with guest worker migrants. As the 1970s and early 1980s demonstrat-
ed, however, migrants do not always leave countries after the onset of economic 
problems, despite offi cial desires for them to do so. The same is true for the current 
crisis, especially with regard to non-EU migrants, who may desist leaving for fear 
that they will face barriers in the future if they want to return (IOM 2010: 4). It is still 
too soon to know whether public opinion about immigration in Western Europe is 
uniformly turning more hostile as different national situations have so far led to 
different results (IOM 2010: 5-6). Nonetheless, an analysis of attitudes in Western 
Europe to immigrants and minorities during past crises provides some unpleasant 
indicators of what can happen during times of severe economic diffi culty. 
De Bromhead, Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2012: 5), in their analysis of right-wing 
political extremism during the Great Depression, have highlighted how economic 
hard times can boost such ideologies in countries containing sizeable immigrant 
populations. Crucially for the study of the current crisis, they found that it was only 
when a contraction persisted for a number of years that noticeable trends arose. 
They argued that political polarization during the late 1920s and 1930s occurred in 
countries that had relatively recent histories of democracy, that had existing right-
wing extremist parties, and that had electoral systems with low barriers for new 
parties to overcome to achieve parliamentary representation. Most signifi cantly, 
however, they considered that the rise of right-wing political extremism during 
the Depression was most profound where depressed economic conditions were 
allowed to persist (de Bromhead/Eichengreen/O’Rourke 2012: 25). In relation to 
the 1970s and beyond, an empirical analysis of voting attitudes from 1970 to 2002 
in OECD countries argued that a one-percentage-point decline in per capita GDP 
growth led to a one-percentage-point increase in the vote share for right-wing or 
nationalist parties (Brückner/Grüner 2010). Interestingly, the same authors found 
that extreme left-wing and communist parties did not tend to benefi t as much from 
economic downturns as their right-wing counterparts.
Whilst some of the southern peripheral West European countries most affected 
by the current crisis have had chequered histories of democracy until the 1970s, 
they have all since established progressive, liberal democracies that show no sign, 
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as yet, of falling apart. Despite generally low thresholds for new parties aiming to 
emerge on the political scene, these same states do not yet host well-established 
extreme right-wing anti-immigrant political parties (apart from Italy). As Art (2011: 
3) notes, the radical right in Western Europe has experienced almost as much failure 
establishing itself as success. It is diffi cult at this stage, therefore, to see how these 
types of organisations could come to national prominence in the West European 
countries currently most affected by the crisis although recent developments in 
Greece look ominous. Perhaps former Communist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, such as Hungary today, will provide extreme right-wing parties with more 
viable options for success in the future; although these countries’ lack of exposure 
to extensive immigration may offset the build-up of explicitly anti-immigrant par-
ties. For those West European countries where right-wing anti-immigration parties 
are already well established, such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Denmark, Italy and Austria, the economic diffi culties may enable these parties to 
further increase their popularity. As Fukuyama (2012: 53) records, populism in the 
aftermath of the fi nancial crisis has taken a distinctly right-wing form rather than a 
left-wing form, an occurrence he explains away by highlighting the current dearth 
of intellectual ideas on the Left.
The repercussions of the economic crisis have already seen some politicians in 
Western Europe target migrants and minorities to demonstrate their resoluteness 
on rules and regulations. Unfortunately, migrants and minorities today cannot rely 
on the European Commission to challenge states’ hard-line positions or actions be-
cause its own rules often facilitate states’ moves. When Italian authorities began 
fi ngerprinting Roma living in camps throughout the country in 2008 the European 
Commission, in contrast to vocal criticism from the European Parliament, quietly 
endorsed Italy’s plans, as the actions acceded to the Commission’s own rules on 
security (Times 2008). The European Commissioner, Viviane Redding, appeared to 
counter this trend when she vocally and scathingly criticised France’s deportation 
of Romanian and Bulgarian Roma in the summer of 2010. She had to later refrain 
from taking legal action against France, however, when it became clear that the 
country had acted within the legal parameters afforded by the EU’s own 2004 di-
rective on free movement of EU citizens, which had allowed France to deport the 
Roma on security grounds (Parker 2012). In many ways, this symbolised the Euro-
pean Commission’s torn role; although it wanted to continue to act in its traditional 
role of safeguarding migrants’ rights against European states’ actions, it found it-
self increasingly hamstrung by the new, more restrictive parameters it had to work 
within. 
4 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted how the infl uence of IGOs in migrant affairs in West-
ern Europe has increased substantially since the 1930s. Nonetheless, as has been 
outlined, this change has come at a signifi cant price. The European Commission, 
currently the most powerful international broker in affecting migration policies in 
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Western Europe, has had to adopt a much less critical role of states’ restrictive 
practices during the present crisis than its predecessors in Brussels in the 1970s and 
the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the 1930s. The European 
Commission today has to promote migration policies that often complement rather 
than challenge member states’ unsympathetic practices. Nonetheless, unwanted 
migrants in Western European states today are, despite this change, still likely to re-
ceive access to a host of rights that their forerunners, especially in the 1930s, had to 
do without. This has derived as a result of the “liberalness of liberal states” (Joppke 
1998: 292) and pro-migrant actors’ increased success in offering support and ad-
vocacy for such people. In the 1930s, national and international voluntary organi-
sations sympathetic to the plight of unwanted migrants objected to governments’ 
increasingly discriminatory practices. But these voluntary organisations had no av-
enues to seriously challenge governments’ actions and frequently campaigned for 
diverging goals (at Evian, for instance, private organisations sought four markedly 
different solutions, as outlined above). The additional political space opened up 
by the end of the Cold War and the major UN impetus to include civil society from 
the early 1990s onwards allowed NGOs to engage in political debate about issues 
such as migration; a development the explosion in global communications further 
enabled (Welch 2001: 3). Moreover, networking between different migrant organisa-
tions ensured increased power (Kjaerum 2003: 207). By referencing humanitarian 
ideals, national commitments to human rights and the rule of law (Epp 1998), pro-
migrant actors have managed to seriously hinder and obstruct Western European 
governments’ moves against unwanted migrants, resulting in a large gap remaining 
between policies formed and policies implemented. As a result, Western European 
states have so far failed to extol the same control over unwanted migrants who have 
managed to reach their countries as occurred in the 1930s. 
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